In the matter between Sumiseki
Introduction and background
Claims for damages in the event of the non-payment of dividends present an interesting economic reality that must be viewed from the company as well as the shareholder's perspective. 1 To shareholders, the payment of a dividend is important, as it indicates growth in their investment portfolios in terms of the return on investment (ROI) ratio. For a company, non-payment contributes favourably to its ability to grow financially or settle its debts in the course of business. But which of these two sides should receive preferential treatment in company law?
It is frequently argued that the courts are reluctant to interfere in the discretionary power of the board, or to assist the general meeting of shareholders, as shareholders always have the option of selling their nonperforming shares to fellow shareholders or the public. In terms of the law, however, this statement must be qualified on two grounds, namely that the constitution of a company represents a contract, and that the avoidance of paying dividends can imply a claim for damages. 2 Although the latter seems applicable and relevant to the South African corporate law environment, South African case law does not support it. Therefore this contribution consults relevant Australian and English case law, and identifies valuable principles laid down in those jurisdictions on the disputability of a company board's discretionary powers as well as the importance of a company constitution in establishing a right, or at least implying a right, to claim an undeclared or unauthorised dividend and/or a declared or authorised dividend that is not paid. 3 It is hoped that the judicial precedent in the United Kingdom and Australia may guide South African courts to possibly put forward a more balanced legal approach than the current one of simply not granting any damages at all. 1 In this regard see Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 537; Visser et al South African Mercantile and Company Law 245-266; Cilliers et al Corporate Law 85-86. 2 See Kilian 2007 THRHR 391. 3 See in general Tyler 1987 HKLJ 230-236; Cassim Practitioner's Guide 116. The 1973 Companies Act in table A referred to declaring and recommending a dividend. The 2008 Act, however, refers only to authorised distributions and does not require shareholders' approval, unless prescribed in the memorandum of incorporation. VAN DEVENTER PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 3 If a dividend is declared but the company fails to effect payment, one may argue the existence of a personal right. On the other hand, in the event of an undeclared dividend it is problematic to make the same assertion. It is always possible to argue that the general meeting of shareholders will eventually vote for a dividend to be declared as such if it is a procedural requirement in the memorandum of incorporation. This statement is largely based on the English matter of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries, 4 where the Court of Appeal extended the rule laid down in Foss v Harbottle 5 and shed some light on why the courts may be reluctant to give effect to a personal right within company law principles:
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An individual shareholder cannot bring an action in the courts to complain of an irregularity (undeclared dividend) in the conduct of the company's internal affairs if the irregularity is one which can be cured by a vote of the company in general meeting (would eventually declare a dividend). 6 However, to allow the general meeting the opportunity to declare a dividend, the board of directors should in the first instance have recommended a dividend for payment. 7 Without such a recommendation, it will be very difficult to claim the existence of either a personal right or a debtor-creditor relationship. These difficulties are the direct result of the Foss matter, where the court described a company as an abstract entity existing largely in abstraction, with the board of directors on the one hand, and the general meeting of shareholders on the other. 8 In many respects, this case still serves as the foundation for the current South African company law position on dividends. Jaffey 1994 Denning LJ 91; Jaffey 1996 JLS 32. It is not clear whether the payment or non-payment of dividends is entirely a management or business decision -the board recommends and the general meeting of shareholders declares the dividend. If either the recommendation or declaration is lacking, no dividend right exists in the law. Also see Van Rooyen 1989 TSAR 593, who argues for void decisions taken by the general meeting of shareholders in the event of the abuse of the majority voting power. On the one hand, it is possible to argue for abuse only when the minority shareholders' rights are changed. A dividend, however, is not a right; thus, technically, it will be difficult to argue for a void majority decision on that basis. On the other hand, Van Rooyen indicates an objective test of whether the majority decision is in fact beneficial for the company, thereby tacitly indicating "fiduciary duties" for the general meeting of shareholders. Further consult Bainbridge 1998 Vill L Rev 741: "… a transaction must make at least one person better off and no one worse off". Vagts 1996 Harv L Rev 48; Blair and Stout 2001 Univ Pa L Rev 1810. Not to declare or recommend a dividend could be an example of opportunistic behaviour. VAN DEVENTER PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 4 In recent years, the so-called "merry-go-round" theory suggested by Esser and Du Plessis has gained some traction. Esser and Du Plessis have proposed that the company is represented by different interests, including the interests of shareholders, employees, the community and the environment, collectively forming the "merry-go-round". 9 This implies that, as the company conducts its business (and the participants move up and down as the merry-go-round rotates), different interests will enjoy preference at different times. 10 The art to be mastered by the courts is to know when preference should be given to shareholders' legitimate expectation of a dividend pay-out over the prerogative of the board of directors not to recommend a dividend, or of an annual general meeting of shareholders not to declare it. 11 After all, if the company is profitable, and neither the board of directors recommended nor the general meeting of shareholders declared a dividend, an individual shareholder should be able to approach a court of law on the basis of the merry-go-round theory. 12 To assist the South African courts in this balancing act, the study will therefore not only make the case for damages where dividends remain unpaid, but will also propose some practical solutions to the problem of calculating damages.
The following discussion of two case law examples from the United Kingdom and Australia respectively supports the merry-go-round theory and reveals certain principles that the South African courts may find useful in striking a better balance between shareholder dividend "rights" and a company's discretionary power not to recommend or declare dividends. Therefore Sibbasbridge relied on section 222 to refuse an inspection on the basis that the above provision did not create a right to inspection. 16 Sibbasbridge further argued that such an inspection would be a breach of fiduciary duties, as the director who requested the inspection would share the information with other persons in the public sphere or in the commercial world, which could potentially cause damage to the company. 17 Importantly, even though the Court of Appeal eventually upheld the lower court's decision not to order the inspection of the financial records on a summary basis, the court reached this decision not because there was no such explicit or implied right but because the purposes for which the relevant director required the inspection were beyond enabling the director to carry out his functions in that capacity. VAN DEVENTER PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 6 the court's reasoning on the board's discretionary power to refuse the director's request.
2.1
The court's reasoning on the board' discretionary power to refuse a director's request to inspect the company's financial records
In considering a remark by the lower court, which had stated that an inspection could cause the company irreparable harm, which would be a direct result of an assumed breach of directors' fiduciary duties in exercising business or management decisions, 18 the Court of Appeal held that no court would act on the mere presumption that such an inspection constituted a breach of fiduciary duties. 19 Instead, it had to be proved that the sole motive for the inspection was in fact to bring about a loss for Sibbasbridge in the form of the sharing of confidential information.
However, the court asked, if an inspection did not amount to a so-called right, as Sibbasbridge contended, could a right perhaps be assumed based on the doctrine of proper purpose? If a director exercises his or her discretionary power not to allow a person to inspect the company's financial statements 20 because the financial reports are regularly made available for review by any person, one may prima facie argue that the person requesting the inspection (whether a fellow director or shareholder) should in any event be aware of the financial position of the company. 21 On the other hand, should the financial manager of the company continuously blunder without the knowledge of his superior or the financial director, 22 it may firstly be said that the delegation of the directors' duties could be considered improper, even though it may have been made in good faith for the benefit of the company. 23 any director access to the financial records of the company 24 on the basis that a director has no explicit right in terms of the Companies Act to ask for an inspection or to view the financial statements, as this would deprive the director of the opportunity to ascertain the financial position of the company and/or to take the necessary action on behalf of the company to rectify the company's financial position. 25 This finding of the Court of Appeal in Oxford Legal Group indicates that the board of directors' discretionary power not to allow an inspection 26 can in fact be challenged successfully even though the Companies Act does not create an explicit right to inspect the financial affairs/statements of the company. 27 This gives rise to the question whether similar reasoning can be applied in order to challenge the board's discretionary power not to recommend or declare a dividend. 28
Applying the reasoning on discretionary power in Oxford Legal Group to the dividend question in South Africa
A rather useful analogy may be drawn between the expectation to inspect the books of the company (dealt with in Oxford Legal Group) and the shareholder's expectation to receive a dividend. Neither has been clearly defined as explicit rights by way of statute. In respect of dividends, the South African Companies Act 29 does not clearly provide for any shareholder's right to a dividend pay-out. However, although the "right" to company dividends is not explicitly catered for by legislation, the Oxford Legal Group reasoning presents some useful points that are equally relevant in making a case for such a right. A first option would be to argue that the discretionary power not to recommend a dividend could be for an improper purpose. Yet to convince a court of law that the board's discretionary power amounts to an improper purpose would not only be very difficult but would also be extremely technical. The argument for dividends will have to be based on accounting principles, and the financial affairs or statements of the company must indicate the availability of profits. 30 Nevertheless, as an alternative to the proper purpose doctrine, a second option would be to rely on the company's memorandum of incorporation, or its constitution, as it is also known. As a contract between the company and its shareholders, the company constitution may regulate company dividends as a personal right, irrespective of whether or not the board has recommended a dividend. In addition, it can create a contractual right to which the board's discretionary power to recommend a dividend may be subordinate i.e. section 46(1) of Act 2008 regulates personal rights, court orders and discretionary powers relevant to dividends. 31 The importance of a personal right that is contrary to the discretionary power to recommend a dividend is clearly illustrated in the Australian matter of Sumiseki Materials.
The Sumiseki Materials case -the company constitution as a contract regulating a shareholder's "right" to dividends
The The profit interest referred to above was the profits made by the company at the end of the financial year, which were also available for dividend payments. In addition, however, Wambo's constitution stated that the profits would depend on the board's discretion (clause 9.1a), that the profits might be transferred to a reserve fund as the directors deemed fit (clause 9.4a), and that so much of the profits as the board deemed fit not to pay out as dividends or to capitalise may be carried over (clause 9.5). 37 Clearly, art 2.1B would have been in conflict with the constitution were it not for the insertion of the words "[d]espite any provision in this constitution to the contrary", which ensured dividend payments. 38 Therefore, at least from a legal perspective, it is quite clear that class B shares were entitled to a dividend, irrespective of any contrary clauses regulating the payment of dividends subject to the discretionary power of the board. 39
From 2007 Wambo suffered severe financial difficulties, and no dividends were paid from 2008. To justify the lack of dividend payments and to circumvent its contractual duty to pay dividends, Wambo's auditors argued that class B shares were in fact debt and not dividends in the true sense of the word: debt, they argued, was not part of company equity; a right to receive payment was a characteristic associated with loans or liabilities. Therefore, by implying that class B shares were actually debt, Wambo tried to prove that Sumiseki was not entitled to a fixed annual dividend. In addition, the auditors advised that any fixed dividend payments would contravene not only section 254T of the Corporations Act, but also Australian company law principles, which simply stated that dividends were not a right, but a discretionary payment. 40 The argument raised by Wambo's attorneys and supported by its auditors was that dividend payments had to be viewed objectively -in other words, in terms of the test of the reasonable person. Although this may appear simple, it is in fact very technical when applied to company law and accounting principles. For example, if the company constitution states that profits are available for dividend payments but the board decides not to pay any dividends, the company balance sheet will obviously disclose available dividends for future payment. profits for dividend distribution is certain; all that is uncertain is the actual payment. 41 The reasonable person does not conclude that no dividends will be paid in future. This uncertainty as to the actual payment of dividends can, however, lead to the depressing possibility that the company might "bank" the available dividends for up to ten consecutive years, making the dividends available only in year 11 or whenever the board decides to pay them.
To circumvent this difficulty, the court interpreted the company constitution in the same manner that any court of law would interpret a contract between parties. 42 The court held that the true objective of the parties was to participate in company profits on an annual basis. Besides this interpretation, the court also applied section 232 of the Corporations Act, which reads as follows: 43 The Court may make an order … if … (a) the conduct of a company's affairs … (e) is oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.
Determining the correct meaning of "oppressive" or "unfairly" required the application of the commercial bystander test, which is relevant to oppressive and unfairly prejudicial company conduct. 44 Even though the defendant's attorneys also relied on the debt-to-service ratio to avoid paying dividends, using a technical argument as to why this ratio was fair from an economic point of view, the court ruled that Sumiseki's right and expectation to receive annual dividend payments had to be upheld and that company law principles in this regard were subordinate to the principles of the law of contract. 45
Awarding damages to a shareholder

The case for awarding damages where dividends remain unpaid
Although companies are artificial persons, with the board of directors as one organ of the company and the general meeting of shareholders as another, Sumiseki Materials also contains certain principles evident in the law of partnerships in South Africa. It is an implied term in the law of partnerships, for example, that all partners have a legitimate expectation to share in the partnership profits in good faith. 48 If profits are made and one of the partners is to be excluded from participating in those profits, 49 the cooperation between the parties is obviously in bad faith, and therefore the partnership cannot technically exist in law. 50 Interestingly, profits give rise to a contractual right, and should a partner not be participating in the profits, 51 his or her right to profit-sharing is protected by means of a partnership contract, which may for example entitle such a partner to a claim for the damages suffered. 52 The same reasoning could be relevant to company law, provided that a few obstacles are addressed. 53 The courts have never before identified a company constitution as a specific kind of contract (i.e. a forward contract), which may be part of the reason why they have been reluctant to award damages to a shareholder whenever a company failed to pay a dividend, as shareholders always have the option of selling their non-performing shares to the public. 54 VAN DEVENTER PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 13 reluctance can be justified as a method of creating legal certainty in the commercial world, the law can still be developed to award damages in appropriate circumstances. 55 The following section provides a few suggestions as to how this may be done in practice.
Although the payment of dividends and the amount of the dividends to be paid in the future will always be uncertain, being characteristic of a forward contract, 56 current facts and circumstances -such as the provisions in the company constitution, the growth rate of the company as well as the book value per share -prove useful in exploring the following simple ways to calculate damages. 57 In assessing the proposed methods set out below, it should also be noted that the actual amount of the damages payable is not as important for this study 58 as the process of considering and identifying different ways of arriving at a fair amount. 59
Potential ways of calculating damages
Contractual damages and ROI:
If the company constitution clearly stipulates that shareholders are entitled to dividends equal to 25% of company profits, such an amount is easy to estimate for the purposes of calculating damages. However, if the constitution is silent on the specific percentage of dividends, the following alternative may be considered: By identifying the discretionary historic dividends, the shareholder could calculate the ROI, as suggested by Kilian and Du Plessis. 60 For instance, if an initial investment (R5 000) in exchange for shares produces dividend returns of R1 500 in year one, R3 500 in year two and R1 400 in the final year for unlisted damages see Stewart v Sashalite Ltd [1936] shares, 61 the total cash inflow equals R6 400. The average cash inflow is thus calculated at R2 133 per year, or 42,6% (R2 133 ÷ R5 000), which will be the percentage damages claimable when the company fails to declare any dividends for the following year. 62 An alternative would be to calculate the damages based on a discount factor/value. Such a calculation reduces the previous years of dividend payments to the initial investment of R5 000 in order to indicate the percentage of the dividends payable on such an initial investment. 63
Damages and return on equity (ROE): According to this suggested method, the growth rate for a particular company is calculated by multiplying its retained turnover by the ROE ratio. If a company is able to retain 75% of its turnover, and the ROE is 15%, the expected growth rate for dividends would be 11,25% (15 x 0,75), which would represent the growth or increase in the previous dividend payment. 64 Damages and history of no dividends declared: Where a company has a history of not declaring dividends, the solution is simply to compare the book value per share with that of previous financial years. If, for example, the company retains 100% of its earnings (or profits) because no dividends were declared, the book value or return on equity could be calculated as follows:
2000
Net profit retained R0 R15
Number of shares 100 100
Increase on book value per share R100 R115 (15% increase) L & Pol'y Rev 266, 307, 308. As no dividends were paid to the shareholders, company equity has increased by 15%. Of course, instead of paying dividends the company could buy back its shares at a 15% higher value. The shares would be repurchased at their book value per share, and the 15% increase on the book value would be added value or, in other words, profits that could be used to pay dividends. 65
When courts are faced with various methods to calculate damages
One could argue that shareholders always have the option of selling their shares for a profit instead of waiting to receive a dividend. 66 However, even though this may be an alternative way to receive cash in the commercial world, what if the shareholder is not willing to sell?
In line with section 158(a) of the Companies Act of 2008, which deals with the development of the law, considering or identifying alternatives is important, as these enable better judgment when, for example, courts have to decide 67 on the remedies available to shareholders to challenge the company's discretion not to recommend dividends, or on how to calculate dividends as damages. 68 The difficulty in applying these various alternatives in practice simply is that courts may be confused as to how the correct formula for calculating dividends should be identified or applied. 69 In this regard, Arnold provides the following clarification: [G] An analysis of the above leads to the following conclusions: Although the total assets of the company increased from 2002 to 2003, the same cannot be said for the net profit or cash in hand. Therefore, the positive end result in total assets creates an illusion that the company is profitable. The net profit of the company, however, decreased in 2003, which may indicate that either the cost of the capital employed by the company was very high 80 or the assets of the company could not produce a sufficient turnover to exceed the previous year's turnover. 81 To pay dividends under such circumstances would clearly be detrimental to the company, in which case the shareholders may rescind dividend payments. 82 Although section 163(2)(j) is a statutory remedy for relief against the oppressive conduct of companies, it is clear from the example above that the company is unprofitable and should not compensate shareholders for any undeclared dividends. The decision of the general meeting of shareholders to refuse to declare dividends may be an indication of oppressive conduct in terms of section 163(1), and relief should be granted only if the financial position of the company is favourable. On the other hand, section 163(2)(h) allows the court to change/vary the constitution to rectify any oppressive conduct. In the Sumiseki Materials case the shareholder successfully argued relief against the oppressive conduct of the company, and as a result the court varied the constitution to give effect to compensation for the unpaid dividends. 83 Orthodox company law principles dictate that dividends are based on the board's discretion, which means that a claim for damages where dividends remain unpaid may seem inconceivable. However, this article has indicated that South African courts may draw some valuable lessons from the reasoning applied in Oxford Legal Group and Sumiseki Materials to develop South African company law to cater for circumstances where a company board's discretion could be validly rejected to claim damages in the event of an unpaid dividend, even where a shareholder's right to a dividend is not explicitly regulated. 84 Having made the case for damages, this study has also proposed certain practical alternatives for calculating the amount of such damages, knowing that to recognise and identify alternatives can only assist in arriving at a more suitable solution than the current South African position of not granting damages at all. 85 Facilitating this development of the common law will not only be in keeping with the spirit of section 158(a) of the 2008 Companies Act, but will also be fairer towards those getting onto the "merry-go-round", by balancing contractual rights with discretionary power so as to give business efficacy to dividends. 86
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